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Roberto Lambertini*
In 2000 Jürgen Miethke published his monograph devoted to trea-
tises de potestate papae.1 In this book, the culmination of many years
of research, Miethke claims that such treatises constituted a literary
genre of their own, which played a pivotal role in the development
of political languages and theories in the ﬁrst half of the fourteenth
century. The genre emerged in the years of the conﬂict between
Philip the Fair and Boniface VIII, but once established, it served as
one of the most important conduits of political theory in the four-
teenth century. This does not entail, of course, that other literary
genres—both then and in other periods—did not also play a role 
in the diﬀusion of political thought. The specula principum are prob-
ably the ﬁrst to come to the mind of the reader who is conversant
with the history of medieval political ideas.2
Although theological quodlibeta are not devoted exclusively to issues
that are pertinent to political thought, as a mirror of princes or a
de potestate papae treatise can be, single questions contained in a quodli-
bet can be very interesting for the student of medieval political ideas.
For reasons connected to the institutional context of the medieval
university,3 political quodlibeta do not exist in same sense that we
speak of theological, juridical, or even medical quaestiones disputatae.4
* Writing this chapter I contracted many debts, especially with Christopher
Schabel, for his support, encouragement and, last but not least, patience. Russell
Friedman kindly provided me with a precious microﬁlm, and Giovanni Ceccarelli’s
help was decisive. For the very fact, however, that I managed to complete it in the
midst of time-consuming academic engagements, I am especially grateful to Marinella:
to her and to Cecilia this is dedicated.
1 J. Miethke, De potestate papae. Die päpstliche Amtskompetenz im Widerstreit der politi-
schen Theorie von Thomas von Aquin bis Wilhelm von Ockham (Tübingen 2000).
2 Cf. e.g. W. Berges, Die Fürstenspeigel des hohen und späten Mittelalters (Schriften des
Reichsinstituts für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde Monumenta Germaniae Historica,
2) (Stuttgart 1938), and A. De Benedictis, ed. (with A. Pisapia), Specula principum
(Frankfurt am Main 1999).
3 C. Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation der Aristotelischen Politica im späten Mittelalter
I (Amsterdam-Philadelphia 1992), pp. 1–34; Miethke, De potestate, pp. 21–4.
4 Cf. Bazàn et al., Les questions disputées.
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In most cases, only a couple of questions can be employed for the
study of political theory. Quodlibetal questions are nevertheless among
our most valuable sources for reconstructing political languages and
political ideas, mainly in the last decades of the thirteenth century,
but also in the ﬁrst twenty years of the fourteenth century, when
the rise of de potestate papae treatises had already begun. As we shall
see, quodlibetal questions only seldom approach a problem of poli-
tical theory in a direct and general way. Perhaps not by chance,
one ﬁnds general treatments more in later quodlibeta than in those
dating from the thirteenth century, which tend to start from very
speciﬁc problems and so usually discuss even core issues from the
particular angle of the question at hand. If Georges de Lagarde man-
aged to write one of his best essays (La philosophie sociale d’Henri de
Gand et Godefroid de Fontaines)5 relying almost entirely on quodlibetal
questions, this should not be attributed solely to his highly specula-
tive approach to the history of political thought. Indeed quodlibeta
provide us with enough material to discern many authors’ political
ideas—if not their political or social philosophy, in de Lagarde’s sense.
As was said, this is especially the case for the last decades of the
thirteenth century, before the discussion found a new forum in the
de potestate papae treatises.
Quodlibeta therefore constitute fascinating but extremely unsystem-
atic and fragmented sources for the investigation of medieval polit-
ical thought. Previous studies have far from suﬃciently exploited
these texts, however, so the aim of the present chapter must be
restricted to showing—via some examples—how certain politically
relevant issues were discussed in quodlibetal questions. The result
will be a preliminary, albeit rough, mapping of the sources for the
history of political thought that are embedded in quodlibetal ques-
tions. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst section will deal with the unity of pru-
dence, the second with the nature of secular and ecclesiastical property,
the third and fourth with the subject of papal power within the
Church and its limits, and the ﬁfth with the question of the opti-
mal form of government and the problem of the origins of power.
5 G. de Lagarde, “La philosophie sociale d’Henri de Gand et Godefroid de
Fontaines,” AHDLMA 8 (1943–45) pp. 75–142. In my opinion, the reworking of
the same materials contained in idem, La naissance de l’esprit laique au déclin du moyen
âge II, Secteur sociale de la scolastique, 2nd edition (Louvain-Paris 1958) is far from an
improvement over this article, although the main thesis remains very similar.
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Political Prudence
As I have indicated elsewhere,6 quodlibetal questions devoted to the
problem of the unity of prudence may contain interesting delibera-
tions concerning politics, because they discuss the relationship between
two “kinds” of prudence, that is between the intellectual virtue as
the leader of all moral virtues with respect to an individual’s life,
and the same virtue as it applies to the life of the political com-
munity. The unity of prudence is itself a very broad issue, encom-
passing central problems of ethical theory such as the relationship
between the intellectual and moral virtues or the connection of moral
virtues with one another.7 This need not concern our present analy-
sis directly. It should be noted that thirteenth-century authors were
also encouraged to broach the question via an Aristotelian passage,
a rather puzzling section from the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics
(1141b23ﬀ ) that deals with a sort of classiﬁcation of various kinds
of prudence. Among them the Stagirite lists individual ethics, ethics
of the household (what medieval authors called oeconomica), and pol-
itics. The context suggests that these diﬀerent kinds of prudence have
something in common but also diﬀer in some way. Medieval com-
mentaries were far from unanimous about what Aristotle’s real inten-
tion was in this passage. In 1310 Henry of Friemar could write
“Haec littera a diversis diversimode exponitur” (“This passage is
interpreted in various ways by diﬀerent interpreters”).
Yet deﬁning the relationship between individual virtue and poli-
tics was not solely an exegetical problem for those lecturing on the
Nicomachean Ethics; its frequent surfacing in theological disputations
attests to its broader relevance. The ﬁrst example known to me is
actually not a quodlibet, but a disputed question by Godfrey of Fontaines,
who develops a long and detailed analysis of the problem of the
6 R. Lambertini, “Est autem et politica et prudentia, idem quidem habitus: appunti
sul rapporto tra prudentia e politica in alcuni interpreti medievali del VI libro
dell’Etica nicomachea (da Alberto Magno a Buridano),” Etica & Politica/Ethics &
Politics 4 (2002), Individuo ed universale nelle dottrine morali del Medio Evo latino, guest edi-
tors G. Alliney and L. Cova (http://www.units.it/~dipﬁlo/etica_e_politica/).
7 O. Lottin, “La connexion des vertus chez Saint Thomas d’Aquin et ses
prédécesseurs,” in idem, Psychologie et morale aux XII e et XIII e siècles III (Louvain-
Gembloux 1949) pp. 197–252; “La connexion des vertus morales acquises de Saint
Thomas d’Aquin à Jean Duns Scot,” ibid., IV (Louvain-Gembloux 1954) pp. 548–663;
see also S.D. Dumont, “The Necessary Connection of Moral Virtue to Prudence
according to John Duns Scotus—Revisited,” RTAM 50 (1988), pp. 184–206.
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unity of prudence in general, but also oﬀers two possible interpre-
tations of the controversial passage contained in the sixth book of
the Ethics.8 Just a few years later, around 1294, James of Viterbo
responds to the quodlibetal question (Quodlibet II, q. 17) Utrum vir-
tutes morales sint connexae. A part of this lengthy question is devoted
to the unity of prudence; James is aware of the existence of diﬀerent
opinions on this issue, but refuses either to accept individual pru-
dence and political prudence as species of a genus (the solution cham-
pioned by Aquinas), or to place them on a scale of perfection. James
prefers to speak of diﬀerent modes of a prudence that is one by
analogy (thus echoing Albert the Great).9 At the beginning of the
fourteenth century, the secular master Thomas of Bailly tackles the
issue and, using Godfrey of Fontaines’ disputed question extensively,
argues that prudence possesses a speciﬁc unity, but that it can be
diﬀerentiated according to varying degrees in diﬀerent individuals.
On the other hand, the diﬀerence existing between a prudent pater-
familias and a prudent politician is linked not only to the essence of
prudence, but also to some instrumental aspects of its exercise.10
Around 1310 John of Pouilly is also very faithful to Godfrey of
Fontaines, but emphasizes an argument that Thomas of Bailly did
not employ: individual prudence and political prudence cannot diﬀer
by species, because this would render any kind of election impossi-
ble. In this discussion, albeit indirectly, we perceive an awareness
that the political community—or at least some political community—
8 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quaestiones ordinariae, q. 3, in Le Quodlibet XV et trois Questions
ordinaires de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. O. Lottin (Louvain 1937), pp. 119–38.
9 James of Viterbo, Disputatio secunda de quolibet, q. 17, ed. E. Ypma (Würzburg
1969), p. 178. Cf. Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica commentum et quaestiones, lib. VI, lec-
tio XI, in idem, Opera Omnia instruenda curavit Institutum Alberti Magni coloniense,
B. Geyer Praeside, vol. XIV/2, ed. W. Kübel (Münster in Westfalen 1987), pp.
467–8: “Dicendum, quod prudentia et politica sunt idem habitus secundum subiec-
tum, sed diﬀerunt secundum modum vel secundum rationem . . . divisio autem in
modos, quando sunt tantum diversae rationes in participatione unius communis,
sicut analogum dividitur. Et talis divisio est hic, quia diversae partes prudentiae,
quas assignat, non sunt diversae species . . .”
10 Thomas of Bailly, Quodlibeta, II, q. 12, ed. P. Glorieux (Paris 1960), pp. 118–24;
on p. 123 one reads: “Politica autem de legibus intendit qualiter erunt optime et
utiles et potentiam (?) terre in qua civitas disponitur, et qualiter murus civitatis se
habeant, et de aquis et de lauacris et de multis que nec ad prudentem nec ad yco-
nomicum pertinent. Sed intelligendum quod cum ista non sint per se intenta sed
quasi quedam adminiculantia . . . Et secundum hoc potest sic exponi dictum Philosophi
VI Ethicorum: est autem politica et prudentia idem habitus, esse non vero idem, ut
dicatur idem habitus propter unitatem primi et principalis obiecti, sed non idem
esse eius propter diuersum esse et propter diuersitatem istorum adminiculantium . . .”
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is not regulated according to a natural diﬀerence in prudence, unlike
in the case of the family, where by nature the father possesses a
higher degree of prudence than his wife and children.11 We can also
reconstruct a similar position from the much abbreviated version of
Gerard of Saint-Victor’s Quodlibet II, q. 5, Utrum prudentia sit una
(1312–13?), which comes down to us in Prosper of Reggio’s recueil
scholaire in Vat. lat. 1086.12 In another question in the same collec-
tion, however, Alain Gontier seems to admit not only a diﬀerence
in degree, but also a distinction of reason.13 On the other hand, the
political prudence that is necessary for living in an aristocracy is a
diﬀerent habitus from the one that is suitable for an oligarchy.14
Gontier does not expand on this point, but it is likely that he means
that diﬀerent kinds of virtue ﬁt diﬀerent types of constitution. This
was, after all, a commonly accepted explanation for a passage in the
third book of Aristotle’s Politics, according to which a good man and
a good citizen are not necessarily identical.15
In his Quodlibet III, q. 10, from between 1314 and 1315,16 Guy
Terrena answers the question Utrum prudentia sit una omnium agibilium.
He, too, rejects the idea of diﬀerent species of prudence, maintaining
11 John of Pouilly, Quodl. IV, q. 8 (in the version contained in BAV, Vat. lat.
1017, ﬀ. 158rb–161vb), f. 161vb: “. . . propter consimilem rationem potest etiam
esse perfectior <scil. prudentia> uel eque perfecta in subdito quam in principe, alio-
quin de subdito numquam poterit ﬁeri princeps, quod falsum est . . .”
12 BAV, Vat. lat. 1086, f. 224va; for a detailed description of the manuscript,
see Codices Vaticani Latini II, pars prior, codd. 679–1134, ed. A. Pelzer (Vatican City
1931), pp. 654–83; on Prosper of Reggio see Schabel-Courtenay, “Augustinian
Quodlibeta,” in volume II of this book.
13 Alain Gontier, Utrum prudentia monastica, yconomica et politica sint una prudentia,
BAV, Vat. lat. 1086, ﬀ. 243ra–vb; esp. f. 243va: “Item: status politici est status vir-
tutis aquisite et exercende, ita est eadem virtus et eadem prudentia; diﬀerunt autem
secundum magis et minus, quia magis perfecte est in politico . . . est diﬀerentia secun-
dum rationem, quia propter bonum ordinis oportet aliquos preesse; nam factus quis
de subdito prelatus, non est mutatus quantum ad prudentiam, sicut nec monachus
quando est factus abbas.”
14 Alain Gontier, Utrum prudentia monastica, yconomica et politica sint una prudentia, ibid.:
“Set accipiendo diversimode ut aristocratica, que est virtuosorum, et oligarchica,
que est divitum, sic certum est quod non est idem habitus, sicut etiam alia est
domini et servi.”
15 For this issue in medieval commentaries on Aristotle’s Politics see the lists in
C. Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation der Aristotelischen Politica im späten Mittelalter II
(Amsterdam-Philadelphia 1992) pp. 107, 116, 144, 147, 150, 155, 156, 159, 161;
the relevant passage is Politica III: 1278b1–5, medieval Latin translation in Aristotelis
Politicorum libri octo cum vetusta translatione Guilelmi de Moerbeka, ed. F. Susemihl (Leipzig
1872), p. 173.
16 See Schabel, “Carmelite Quodlibeta,” in volume II of this book.
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that prudence must be essentially one. Otherwise, the process accord-
ing to which a former subject becomes rector civitatis would be incon-
ceivable, since prudence must be acquired through experience
and—obviously—nobody can experience the role of the ruler with-
out being in charge. Echoing Godfrey of Fontaines’ solution, Guy
Terrena admits only a diﬀerence in perfection or distinctions secun-
dum rationem.17
Quodlibetal discussions bear witness to a lasting eﬀort to ﬁnd a
solution that could both safeguard the unity of prudence and account
for the speciﬁcity of political prudence. The vast majority of authors
tend to limit the diﬀerence between rule over oneself—so to speak—
and rule over others to non-essential features of the same virtue.
The masters even employ the historical experience of autonomous
civic governments (which surfaces in the use of the expression “rec-
tor civitatis,” for example), applying the principle of alternation in
oﬃces, in order to argue against separating politics from the other
branches of practical philosophy.
Possessions, Property Rights and Power
The ﬁrst examples of quodlibetal disputations regarding the rela-
tionship between property and power are connected with the issue
of ownership, whether of secular or ecclesiastical goods.18 Indeed,
one of the most interesting texts in which Henry of Ghent voices
his political views bears the title Utrum bonum sit omnia esse communia
17 Guy Terrena, Quodl. III, q. 10, BAV, Borghese 39, f. 158rb–160ra; f. 158rb:
“Preterea, ut dicit Philosophus 6° Ethicorum, prudentia ﬁt per experientiam que
requirit multitudinem temporis, et si prudentia qua aliquis regit ciuitatem non est
eadem secundum speciem cum illa qua quis regit se ipsum, tunc oportet quod rec-
tor ciuitatis acquirat eam per experientiam exercendo se circa actus regis. Tunc
quero: quando acquirit istam prudentiam? Non quando est subditus, quia non
exerceret actus regis ut circa eos possit//158va//experientiam accipere. Ergo in
quantum aliquis antequam sit rector poterit habere prudentiam politicam, quia est
inconueniens ut prius ﬁat rector quam sciat regere”; f. 160ra: “. . . propter quod
dicit Philosophus: ‘Est autem politica et prudentia idem habitus’ secundum essen-
tiam et specie, ‘esse non autem idem’ quia non <est> sic perfectus omnis habitus
sicut alius semper, ut ex dictis patet, unde Commentator dicit ibi quod diﬀerunt
ratione.”
18 For example, see Eudes of Châteauroux, who seems to have discussed in
1238/40 Utrum primi rerum usurpatores, ut reges et principes, potuerunt sibi appropriare res de
jure naturali communes sine peccato; cf. Glorieux II, pp. 75–6.
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in civitate. In this question, most probably discussed in 1279, Henry
comes to terms with Aristotle’s critique of Plato in the second book
of the Politics. The Church approves the community of goods as far
as religious communities are concerned, but it is sharply criticised
by the Philosopher. After assessing the substantial agreement among
the philosophers and the Apostle Paul about the social nature of
man, Henry introduces a double distinction. First, one has to dis-
tinguish between two diﬀerent “states” of mankind: the state of inno-
cence and the fallen state. Second, it is possible to discern three
ways of possessing things: holding everything in common, without
any distinction; keeping private goods for oneself, without placing
them at the disposition of others; retaining some goods for oneself
and making another portion available for the use of others. In turn,
this third possibility can be implemented either in cases of necessity
alone or in every case that is ﬁtting.
Building on this framework, Henry claims that Socrates (although
Henry is well aware of the fact that in this case Plato is speaking
through his teacher) never meant what Aristotle ascribes to him.
According to his interpretation of the Timaeus (not having access to
Plato’s Republic), Henry thinks that Socrates and Plato imagined a
community where each person loved the possessions of the others
“as if they were his own” and was ready to share his own posses-
sions with the others. Although it is not clear how the heathen Plato
could be aware of this Christian truth, this would be the best solu-
tion, according to the secular master, because it ﬁts the original
uncorrupted human nature. This mode of possession was also adopted
by Christians, even if in an imperfect manner, thanks to the help
of divine grace. If we take into consideration fallen human nature,
without grace, then Aristotle is right: goods should be owned pri-
vately and shared with others only in case of necessity. In conclu-
sion, for Christians Henry suggests a sort of compromise between
Plato and Aristotle: the more Christians love one another, the closer
they come to Plato’s solution. This is the case, e.g., for the more
perfect religious orders; but the frailty and imperfection of men makes
this impossible for the rest of society.19
19 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IV, q. 20, in Quodlibeta Magistri Henrici Goethals a Gandavo
(ed. Paris 1518, reprint Louvain 1961), ﬀ. 134v–136r; f. 136r: “Et licet dispositio
Socratis erat melior simpliciter, dispositio vero Aristotelis melior secundum statum
naturae lapsae in solis naturalibus sine gratia existentis, neutra tamen est melior
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Henry’s question deserves our attention not only for his passion-
ate defence of Plato (which by the way is also adopted by one of
his most acrimonious adversaries, Giles of Rome),20 but also because
in this way the secular master stresses the diﬀerence between lay
and ecclesiastical possessions. The issue of church possessions proved
to be fruitful for further analysis in several respects. On the one
hand, it was often connected with the problem of the taxation of
lay and ecclesiastical goods. For example, in his Utrum papa possit
alicui pro utilitate ecclesiae concedere decimas de bonis laicorum, et eos ad earum
solutionem compellere 21 (Quodlibet VI, q. 2, 1281/82), Henry argues in
favour of the papal plenitude of power in order to justify the right
of the Roman pontiﬀ to grant an individual (one naturally thinks of
a king who needs to ﬁnance a campaign or a crusade) the power
to collect tithes from the laity and clergy alike. This is only accept-
able in cases of necessity, however, and applies especially to lay
goods, because with ecclesiastical goods arguments from necessity
can be less compelling, since the clergy own their goods in com-
homini in statu naturae per gratiam reparatae quantum ad totum populum chris-
tianum; aut quantum ad communitates civitatum. Immo expedit dispositio media,
partim communicans cum dispositione Aristotelis quo ad proprietatem possessionum
et partim cum dispositione Socratis, scilicet quo ad communitatem aﬀectionum.
Quanto enim quis plus in gratia perﬁcit, tanto communiorem aﬀectionem habet ad
omnes, et minus aﬃcitur circa proprietarias possessiones; ita quod perfectio gratiae
omnia propria facit abiicere et sua omnia aliis communicare, sicut nunc inter per-
fectiores in sacris religionibus observatur, quod tamen in communitatibus civitatum
propter fragilitatem et imperfectionem hominum omnino observari non potest.”
20 For a more detailed analysis and comparison with Giles of Rome’s De regimine
principum, see R. Lambertini, “Philosophus videtur tangere tres rationes. Egidio Romano
lettore ed interprete della Politica nel terzo libro del De regimine Principum,” DSTFM
1 (1990), pp. 277–325. In his later Quodlibet III, q. 7 (ed. Louvain 1646, reprint
Frankfurt am Main 1966), p. 145a, Utrum nutritus in aliqua lege falsa possit naturaliter
venire in cognitionem quod illa lex sit falsa, Giles does not mention any interpretation
“in meliorem partem” of Plato’s “communism”; in this case it is only an example
of an error which can be refuted by means of natural reason alone.
21 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. VI, q. 23, ed. G.A. Wilson (Henrici de Gandavo Opera
Omnia, 10) (Leuven 1987), pp. 210–22, pp. 221–2: “Ratione ergo delicti atque pec-
cati, ad minus tempore necessitatis, dico quod papa potest dare ad defensionem et
sustentationem ecclesiae decimas accipiendas a laicis, et eis indicere, et si opus fuerit
ad ipsas tribuendas compellere . . . Non enim potest deponere papa principes, nisi
ratione delicti aut insuﬃcientiae . . . et secundum hoc sacerdos apostolicus se habet
ad reges et principes sicut architector civilis ad alios artiﬁces in civitate. Sicut enim
architectonici est praecipere, qui et quales debent exercere scientiam medicinalem,
rhetoricam et sic de aliis in civitate, et quosdam admittere, quosdam repellere, sic
sacerdos apostolicus debet considerare, qui et quales regna et principatus regere
debeant et bonos honorare, malos autem et male agentes deponere, et alios loco
illorum substituere . . .”
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mon. This example shows how, in Henry’s writings, the theory of
diﬀerent kinds of lordship can be linked to the issue of the relationship
between secular and ecclesiastical powers. Moreover, as Matthew
Kempshall has shown in a very important study, the problem of the
limits of power can also arise in such quodlibetal questions.22 Returning
to a similar although not identical question some years later (Quodlibet
IX, q. 31, 1286), Utrum clerici teneantur ad exactiones quas laici soluunt
civitatibus et dominis temporalibus, Henry stresses the fact that the clergy
are not obliged to pay unless the defence of the faith or justice is
at stake. But even in this case this should occur at the request of
the bishops.23 In attempting to reconstruct Henry’s views from such
responses, one gathers that he thinks that ecclesiastical goods are
owned in a peculiar way and cannot be applied to purposes sepa-
rate from the needs of the Church, unless an ecclesiastical authority
gives special permission. In cases of necessity, the pope can also
intervene in the temporal sphere in virtue of his plenitude of power.
In the same years, the Franciscan Roger Marston tackled the ques-
tion of the right of secular rulers to tax their subjects, from the par-
ticular angle of a person who perjured while charged with assessing
the value of goods for taxation. Here the Franciscan theologian
stresses the limits of secular power in this respect.24 Godfrey of
Fontaines also expressed his opinion concerning taxation (especially
on the part of temporal rulers) in several quodlibetal questions; in
his Quodlibet VII, q. 14 (1290–92),25 answering the seemingly abstruse
question Utrum retinentes quod eis impositum est teneantur illud restituere et
hoc illi qui recipit dictam collectam ad ﬁrmam—but which Matthew Kempshall
has cleverly explained—Godfrey maintains that it is licit to pay a
tax that a lord has exacted unjustly, in order to avoid a greater
22 M.S. Kempshall, The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought (Oxford
1999), esp. pp. 192–4.
23 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IX, q. 31, ed. R. Macken (Leuven 1983), pp. 327–30.
24 Roger Marston, Quodl. IV, q. 39, Utrum possint absolvi nisi restituant, qui propter
iuramentum suum faciunt alieno domino perdere de iure suo quando aestimant bona suorum de
quibus reddere debent decimam vel decimam quintam, in Quodlibeta Quatuor, eds. G.F. Etzkorn
and I.G. Brady (Quaracchi-Florence 1960), pp. 450–2. It is noteworthy that Roger
seems to be rather indulgent toward those who “resisted” unjust taxation with a
false oath.
25 For the dating of Godfrey’s Quodlibeta I follow here Wippel’s results: J.F. Wippel,
The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines. A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy
(Washington, DC, 1981), pp. 27–8, restated also in idem, “Godfrey of Fontaines
(b. ca 1250; d. 1306–1309),” in Individuation in Scholasticism. The Later Middle Ages and
the Counter-Reformation, 1150–1650, J.E. Gracia, ed. (Albany 1994), pp. 221–56.
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evil.26 Some years later (1295–96), Godfrey was confronted with a
question that is wider in scope (Quodlibet XI, q. 17): Utrum princeps
dicens se habere causam pro utilitate reipublicae nec tamen huiusmodi necessitas
est de se notoria possit imponere aliquam exactionem et subiecti teneantur sol-
vere. He used this opportunity to express his distrust of the heredi-
tary principle and to claim, on Aristotle’s authority, that a ruler must
rule according to the laws and order his actions towards the common
good. As a consequence, taxation is tied to consent. Godfrey remarks
that tyrants, too, often appeal to the common good and claim that
they have sought the advice of good counsellors; therefore, especially
when there are good reasons for doubting the righteousness of the
king and his curia, it is necessary for a suﬃciently extended group
of wise and faithful men to approve the decisions. If this is not the
case, the subjects have the right to resist such unlawful taxation.27
In the same Quodlibet XI, q. 12 (Utrum solutio decimarum sit de necessi-
tate salutis), Godfrey admitts that it is legitimate for the pope to ask
Christians to pay tithes for purposes that are ordered toward the
good of the Church. This does not mean, however, that he is ready
to grant the pope a universal lordship over lay and ecclesiastical
goods in general. He prefers not to give a determination on this
issue, and limits himself to admitting that the pope possesses a plen-
itude of power in spiritual matters and consequently in temporal
issues—such as the payment of tithes—that are crucial for the Church
to reach its spiritual goal.28 Moreover, in the following Quodlibet XII,
26 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. VII, q. 14, eds. M. De Wulf and J. Hoﬀmans
(Louvain 1914), pp. 395–6: “Nunc autem in casu proposito, licet ille cui pecunia
sic communitati imposita et ab ea exacta tribuitur iniuste, et male eam recipiat et
sua potestate tyrannizans quadam violentia extorqueat, et eam etiam restituere
teneretur, quia tamen a rectoribus communitatis ut maius malum totius communi-
tatis evitetur tanquam malum minus hoc eligitur ut vexatio indebita redimatur, ideo
ab eis iuste communitati imponitur.” Cf. Kempshall, The Common Good, pp. 248–50.
27 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. XI, q. 17, ed. J. Hoﬀmans (Louvain 1933), pp.
77–8: “. . . quod suﬃcit quod princeps dicat ita esse et quod hoc facit bono et
magno consilio, non valet. Quia tali modo tyranni etiam dicere consueverunt. Et
sic si non constet aliter de uno quam de alio, sicut tyrannus nititur principari secun-
dum propriam voluntatem, ita et bonus princeps . . . In tali autem casu, scilicet cum
princeps solo suo consilio privato contentus tale onus imponit nec vult quod aliis
causa vel necessitas propter quam imponitur innotescat, deberent subditi resistere,
si possent, quousque esset per praedictos prudentes suﬃcienter discussum; alioquin
paulatim regnum in tyrannidem converteretur et subditi liberi redigerentur ad condi-
cionem servorum subditorum.”
28 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. XI, q. 12, ed. Hoﬀmans cit., p. 60: “Si enim
habet papa ius et dominium super omnia bona temporalia quorumcumque hominum
in hoc mundo, non solum clericorum sed etiam laicorum, et de omnibus potest
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q. 19, Utrum status religiosorum nihil habentium sit perfectior statu aliquid
habentium, Godfrey observes that the pope is not even the lord of the
ecclesiastical goods, but merely the steward, because they are owned
in common by the whole Church.29
Henry’s and Godfrey’s quodlibeta are among the most studied texts
dealing with the issue of taxation, but one should not forget that
other authors had to respond to similar questions in the same period
of time. To recall only a few examples, in March 1282, in his Quodlibet
I, qq. 1–2, Berthaud of Saint-Denis defended the clergy’s exemp-
tion from tolls and similar duties, but also the papal right to grant
exemption from royal taxes. While admitting papal superiority even
in temporal matters, Berthaud conceded that it is licit for the pope
to act in this way only in certain circumstances; nevertheless, if he
does so in the absence of such conditions, solely by virtue of his
plenitude of power, one should tolerate this abuse patiently.30 In the
mid-eighties of the same century, Richard of Menneville (Middleton)
answered a question (Quodlibet II, q. 30) Utrum clerici possint cogi ad
solutionem exactionum factarum in civitate propter utilitatem boni communis,
where he argues in favour of the involvement of the clergy only in
cases where their possessions (meaning those besides tenths and pious
donations) would proﬁt from an initiative aiming at the common
disponere, sicut aliqui videntur sentire, planum est quod posset ordinare sicut plac-
eret quod tales talibus tantum vel tantum darent et debita quae aliquibus etiam
laicis debentur posset remittere creditoribus. Et secundum hoc planum est quod
potest statuere quod laici tantam vel tantam portionem bonorum suorum dent mini-
stris Ecclesiae. Sed hoc dare papae est satis magnum. Sic enim, sicut facit transla-
tionem episcoporum et mutationem bonorum ecclesiasticorum et personarum, posset
etiam uni principi auferre sui principatum et alteri dare et principem ab uno prin-
cipatu ad alium transferre etiam sine delicto. Item principatus libere dividere et
unire; quod tamen non libenter principes sustinerent. Sed de hoc ad praesens nihil
determino; sed hoc tantum nunc assero quod papa per se et directe habet a Deo
plenam potestatem in spiritualibus et in his quae ad salutem populi ordinantur; et
in quantum ad hoc sunt bona temporalia quorumcumque necessaria, ex consequenti
habet potestatem super illa.”
29 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. XI, q. 19, ed. Hoﬀmans cit., p. 147: “. . . licet
Papa tanquam Christi vicarius et pater ac praelatus quodam modo generalis sit
omnium bonorum Ecclesiae ad utilitatem rei publicae dispensator . . .”
30 Berthaud of Saint-Denis, Utrum clerici teneantur solvere pedagia vel tributa; Utrum papa
possit eximere clericos aut subditos principum a pedagio vel tributis; edition in J. Leclercq,
“Deux questions de Berthaud de Saint-Denis sur l’exemption ﬁscale du clergé,” in
Études d’histoire du droit canonique dédiées à G. Le Bras I (Paris 1965), pp. 607–17, esp.
611–13, 616: “Sed pone quod papa in hoc casu de plenitudine potestatis eximeret
aliquem subditum principis a tributo de iure debito, numquid tenendum erit quod
erit actum a papa? Responsio: dico quod si contingeret quod papa hoc faceret,
adhuc pie tolerandum esset.”
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good.31 In Quodlibet III, q. 27, Utrum laici subditi dominis temporalibus
teneatur soluere tallias de nouo impositas, quae non vergunt nisi in utilitatem
dominorum, he supports the right to resist taxation exacted without
the consent of the subjects and merely for the private beneﬁt of the
ruler.32 In 1298, Peter of Auvergne debated Utrum princeps qui neces-
sitate rei publicae imminente instituit vectigal aliquod in subditis, necessitate rece-
dente, teneatur ipse vel successor eius removere illud, stipendiis suﬃcientibus ad
dispensationem ipsius.33 Appealing to the axiom cessante causa, cessat eﬀectus,
Peter argues against the legitimacy, on part of the king as well, of
perpetuating a state of emergency in order to make an extraordi-
nary tax habitual.34
One can appreciate the political implications of discussions con-
cerning the rights of taxation on the part of secular and ecclesiasti-
cal rulers in James of Viterbo’s Quodlibet I, q. 17 (1293/94), Utrum
papa possit absolvere aliquem usurarium, absque quod usuras restituat. Super-
ﬁcially, the issue at stake here would appear to have no connection
to the problems discussed above, but James grounds his positive
answer on the assumption that the pope has jurisdiction—although
in diﬀerent ways—over all goods, both lay and ecclesiastical, in the
same way that he possesses both spiritual and temporal power.35
Matthew Kempshall is right to stress the close connection not only
31 Richard of Menneville, Quodl. II, q. 30, in Opera, IV (Brescia 1691), pp. 78–80,
esp. p. 80: “Tunc dico quod si cives faciunt pontem reﬁci, et vias reparari cum
expensis proportionatis ipsis operibus et facultatibus clericorum, quod tunc clerici
tenentur solvere partem suam, saltem de illis possessionibus in quibus levitica por-
tio non consistit.”
32 Richard of Menneville, Quodl. III, q. 27, ed. cit., pp. 125–6, p. 125: “Utique
liberi tantummodo talias, quae directe vel indirecte in boni communis utilitatem
redundant, solvere tenentur . . .”
33 Cf. E.A.R. Brown, “Cessante causa and the Taxes of the Last Capetians: the
Political Applications of a Philosophical Maxim,” Studia gratiana 15 (1972), pp. 567–87;
p. 587: “. . . sed cessante necessitate subditi non tenentur exhibere pedagium nec
peccant si non exhibeant, tum quia statutum principis non obligat eos ed exhiben-
dum nisi durante necessitate, tum quia non tenentur nisi ad ea que sunt necessaria
uel expediencia ad saluationem boni communis, igitur cessante necessitate non debet
princeps secundum iusticie equitatem vectigal exigere.”
34 C. Flüeler, “Ontologie und Politik: Quod racio principantis et subiecti sumitur ex
racione actus et potencie. Zum Verhältnis von Metaphysik und Politik in den ersten
Kommentaren zur aristotelischen Politica,” FZPT 41 (1994), pp. 445–62, has pointed
out that Peter has a tendency to corroborate his political theories with parallels to
metaphysical principles.
35 James of Viterbo, Disputatio prima de quolibet, q. 17, ed. E. Ypma (Würzburg
1968), pp. 207–15, p. 207: “Quia vero pecunia, vel id quod pecunia mensurari
potest, est aliquod temporale, ideo papa huiusmodi donationem vel relaxationem
facere non potest, nisi potestatem habeat et iurisdictionem super temporalibus.”
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with the problem of the relationship between pope and king, but
also with the historical circumstance that Philip the Fair exacted sub-
stantial sums from Jewish and Christian usurers; it is licit to use
these large sums of money for other purposes only on the condition
that it would be impossible for them to be returned to the people
from whom they had been unjustly extorted.36 Only the privilege of
absolution from sin without the duty of restitution could make these
proﬁts morally “usable” by the king.
Recently, another important connection between this quodlibet and
the events of the reign of Philip the Fair has come to light: Karl
Ubl and Lars Vinx discovered that, in his prologue to De potestate
regia et papali, John of Paris makes extensive use of James’ Quodlibet
I, q. 17, in describing what he names “Herod’s error,” that is the
pro-papal position that attributes to the supreme pontiﬀ jurisdiction
over ecclesiastical and lay goods alike.37 If it is true that John partly
misconstrues James’ position, interpreting his papal stewardship as
plain lordship, textual evidence shows once again how tightly the
problem of the nature of possession and the issue of the powers of
the pope were intertwined. Thus it comes as no surprise that, a
decade later, John of Mont-Saint-Eloi, in answering the question
(Quodlibet II, q. 2) Utrum esset bonum et expediens quod omnium christiano-
rum possessiones essent communes, after accepting the opinion that Plato
in reality never suggested that wives and children should be in com-
mon, stresses that the community of goods is indeed adopted in the
Church. Ecclesiastical goods are therefore common to the whole
clergy, while the pope is only their steward.38 According to John,
36 Kempshall, The Common Good, pp. 250–2.
37 K. Ubl and L. Vinx, “Kirche, Arbeit und Eigentum bei Johannes Quidort von
Paris O.P. (†1306),” in Text—Schrift—Codex. Quellenkundliche Arbeiten aus dem Institut für
Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, C. Egger and H. Weigl, eds. (Wien-München 2000),
pp. 304–44, esp. pp. 327–9; cf. Johannes Quidort, De regia potestate et papali, proeemium,
Textkritische Edition mit deutscher Übersetzung, ed. F. Bleienstein (Stuttgart 1969),
pp. 70–1.
38 John of Mont-Saint-Eloi, Quodl. II, q. 2, BAV, Vat. lat. 1086, f. 217rb–vb;
esp. f. 217va: “Nec credo Platonem sic intelligere ut Aristoteles sibi imponit, quod
uxores essent communes, quia periret cura ﬁliorum et, cum essent vetule, nullus
curaret de eis et sequeretur discordia inter omnes ut patet . . . Dicendum quod potest
intellegi quantum ad ius et proprietatem, ita quod omnes haberent et sic non est
bonum, quia talis modus pareret negligentiam, et confusionem et inordinationem,
quia ita pertinet ad unum sicut ad alium, ideo aliqua policia numquam talis fuit.
Item modus apostolorum fuit optimus et tamen non fuit talis . . . Sic aliter dicendum
de bonis ecclesiasticis et laycorum: nam bona ecclesiastica sunt omnia communia
clericis, papa tamen principaliter et alii ex consequenti habent dispensare et non
sunt proprietarii.”
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since the pope is only the steward and not the lord of ecclesiastical
goods, he is not allowed to dispose of these goods as he pleases, but
only for the good of the Church.39 The concept of stewardship, as
opposed to lordship, although extended to the goods of the univer-
sal Church so that other ecclesiastical stewards depend on the pope,
puts some limits on his plenitude of power. John would also advo-
cate a similar solution for the goods of Christian laymen, if charity
were strong enough. Unfortunately, this is not the case.40
Secular Clergy versus Mendicant Friars: 
Papal Power and Church Structure
It is rather well known—and Elsa Marmursztejn points it out clearly
in this volume—that another issue oﬀering many opportunities for
debates with great relevance for political theory is the relationship
between the mendicant orders and the secular clergy. Using quodli-
betal questions, Gerard of Abbeville had already (ca. 1268–69) voiced
his criticism of the very idea of a religious life founded on mendi-
cancy.41 Mendicant friars, such as the Franciscan John Pecham, sup-
ported the opposite view in their own quodlibeta.42
39 John of Mont-Saint-Eloi, Quodl. II, q. 2, ibid.: “expedit tamen quod papa dis-
penset . . . et quod non sit proprietarius . . . et hoc expedit bono communi, quia tunc
magis potest contemplare diuina; item magis saluatur unitas et permanencia bono-
rum ecclesie.”
40 John of Mont-Saint-Eloi, Quodl. II, q. 2, ibid., f. 217va–b: “Sed de posses-
sionibus omnium Christianorum dicendum quod si supponeretur quod quilibet magis
attentus esset ad bonum commune ex caritate dei et proximi, haberent sicut primi
conuersi et aliqui essent dispensatores, melius esset propter rationes dictas; nam
stante suppositione esset maior amicitia inter homines et esset modus qui fuisset in
statu innocentie . . . Sed . . . quod maior pars hominum est sine caritate et quod stul-
torum est inﬁnitus numerus, dico quod non est bonum, quia bonum commune
periret quia nullus vellet laborare nec sollicitus esse in artibus necessariis, mercanciis
et aliis necessariis; nam postquam quilibet uideret quod de lucro [et labore] tan-
tum haberet non laborans quam laborans, nollet laborare.”
41 A. Teetaert, “Quatre questions inédites de Gérard d’Abbeville pour la défense
de la superiorité du clergé séculier,” Archivio italiano per la storia della pietà 1 (1951),
pp. 83–178, in particular pp. 128–63 (more precisely according to BAV, Vat. lat.
1015), Gerard of Abbeville, Quodl. V, qq. 5–6: Utrum communium ecclesie facultatum dis-
pensatio in prelatis diminuat de excellencia perfectionis; Utrum habere et administrare communes
ecclesie facultates expediat prelatis ad sui status perfectionem et oﬃcii administrationem; Quodl.
XVI, qq. 1–2, pp. 168–78: Utrum Xristus docuerit ad apicem summe perfectionis apostolos
et prelatos nichil omnino habere in proprio et in communi; Utrum praelati recipere potuerunt pos-
sessionem sine diminutione perfectionis.
42 Cf. John Pecham, Quodl. IV, q. 48, Utrum non habentes aliquid in proprio vel com-
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In the heyday of quodlibetal disputations, that is in the years of
Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, the mendicant/secular
struggle was fought primarily along two fronts. First, the hotly debated
issue of the mendicant right to hear confessions, stimulated by Martin
IV’s bull Ad fructus uberes, was tightly linked to the problem of papal
power within the Church with particular regard to the constitution
of the Church.43 Henry of Ghent championed a position according
to which the basic rights of parish priests and bishops should be
defended by papal intervention, not diminished by the pope’s privi-
leges. The question whether Ad fructus uberes could be interpreted in
the sense that a ﬁdelis was no longer obliged to confess his sins to
his parish priest at least once a year, as established in the Fourth
Lateran Council, soon evolved into a controversy over the nature
and limits of papal power in the Church. Henry’s quodlibetal writings
stand out as the most important contribution to this long-lasting 
dispute.44 Following Congar’s ground-breaking studies, we can view
it as a clash between two diﬀerent ecclesiologies.45 The mendicant
friars saw the pope as the direct source of every (not sacramental)
muni sint aliis perfectiores, in Quodlibeta quatuor, Quodlibeta I–III, ed. G.J. Etzkorn, Quodlibet
IV (Romanum), ed. F.-M. Delorme, revisit G.J. Etzkorn (Grottaferrata 1989), pp.
280–6 (1277–79).
43 The ecclesiological implications of this debate had already emerged clearly,
however, before Ad fructus uberes, e.g. in Pecham’s so called Quodlibet romanum (1277–79);
cf. John Pecham, Quodl., IV, q. 47, Utrum liceat alicui, sine licentia proprii sacerdotis vel
ipso invito, audire confessiones subditorum suorum de licentia superioris praelati vel ex privilegio,
ed. cit., pp. 274–80, in particular pp. 275–6: “Primum est quod tale privilegium
potest concedi a Sede Apostolica, ut de licentia superiorum praelatorum invitis sac-
erdotibus possint audire confessiones alienorum parochianorum . . . Primum patet
per eﬀectum et per Sedem Apostolicam est determinatum, quae ius habet deter-
minandi quia per ipsam facta est distinctio ecclesiarum, XII, quaest. 1, Nulli epis-
coporum, unde hereticum est aliud dicere vel sentire.”
44 Cf. e.g. his Quodlibet X (1286/87): Henry of Ghent, Quodl. X, qq. 1–2, ed. 
R. Macken (Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia, 14) (Leuven-Leiden 1981), pp.
4–38: Utrum error sit dicere quod vere poenitens et confessus, rite absolutus ab eo qui potest eum
absolvere de gratia et privilegio speciali, teneatur eadem peccata iterato conﬁteri de iure communi;
pp. 39–55: Utrum ex commissione generali qua conceditur aliquibus ex privilegio et de gratia
posse audire confessiones et absolvere a peccatis simpliciter, concedatur potestas absolvendi a maioribus
criminibus reservatis episcopis; q. 31 of his Quodlibet XII was reworked into his Tractatus
de facto praelatorum et fratrum. On this important document see L. Hödl, “Theolo-
giegeschichtliche Einführung” to Henricus de Gandavo, Tractatus super facto prelatorum
et fratrum (Quodlibet XII, quaestio 31), eds. L. Hödl and M. Haverals (Henrici de
Gandavo Opera Omnia, 17) (Leuven 1989), pp. VII–CXVII.
45 Y.M.-J. Congar, “Aspects ecclésiologiques de la querelle entre mendiants et
séculiers dans la seconde moitié du XIIIe et le début du XIVe,” AHDLMA 36 (1961),
pp. 35–151.
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power in the Church; as supreme judge he is able to change the
ecclesiastical constitution as he pleases, according to what he con-
siders best for the Church. His plenitude of powers has no limits in
this regard. The secular clergy advocated an interpretation of the
papal plenitude of power as the supreme guarantee of the Church
constitution. The pope cannot grant a privilege that has detrimen-
tal consequences for the whole Church. Papal bulls should therefore
be interpreted in a way that safeguards the rights of the parish clergy,
lest the constitution of the Church be completely upset. If the pope
insists on an interpretation that implies the subversion of the eccle-
siastical order, in his Tractatus (1288) Henry envisages the possibility
of resistance to the pope, and even his deposition, although not in
explicit terms.46
Godfrey was also asked to take sides on several occasions, most
notably in 1294/95 when he was confronted with the question
(Quodlibet X, q. 17) Utrum religiosus sine licentia sui superioris proprii, puta
abbatis, possit impetrare litteras a praelato altiori, puta a papa, auctoritate
quarum possit conﬁteri alteri quam suo abbati. In his answer, the Flemish
theologian overtly denies that the pope can treat bishops as if they
were his “bailiﬀs”; he can remove individuals from their positions
or diminish their rights, but only for a reasonable cause. Should a
person obtain a privilege from the pope that damages the common
good of the Church, he ought not to make use of it.47 Matthew
Kempshall is probably right in suggesting that Godfrey is more mod-
erate than Henry.48 Interestingly enough, however, the Dominican
theologian Bernard of Auvergne nevertheless felt the need to attack
Godfrey exactly on the issue of the comparison between bishops and
bailiﬀs: this critique was not expressed in a quodlibetal question, but
its existence bears witness to the importance that was attributed to
quodlibeta in this ﬁeld as well. In Bernard’s opinion, Godfrey is wrong
in his attempt to put limits on the papal plenitude of power. Bernard’s
46 Cf. Kempshall, The Common Good, p. 187, based on the Tractatus super facto prae-
latorum et fratrum III, 10a ratio, ed. cit., pp. 253–9, esp. p. 259: “supplicandum esset
ei humiliter in principio ab universis episcopis et praelatis curam habentibus, quod
dictum privilegium revocaret, et esset ei exponendum a viris litteratis qualia incon-
venientia ex hoc sequerentur, quod, si forte facere nollet, timendum est, ne satis
cito schisma maximum et inoboedientia subiectorum ad superiores suos oriretur,
nisi aliter ecclesiae Dei cito provideretur.”
47 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. X, q. 10, ed. J. Hoﬀmans (Louvain 1924), pp.
391–4.
48 Kempshall, The Common Good, pp. 244–5.
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critique reveals how divergent the ecclesiologies were and how care-
fully many mendicant theologians opposed any limitation on the
pope’s right to intervene in the problems of the Church constitution,49
being reluctant to admit any kind of right to resist his decisions.
Although this trend in the interpretation of papal power was pre-
dominant among the mendicant friars, dissent could also arise among
them. This is the case with Peter John Olivi. Olivi shares the men-
dicant ecclesiology in its key features and is ready to defend the priv-
ileges granted to the friars, as a question from book four of his
Commentary on the Sentences clearly shows.50 Nevertheless, in his
Quodlibet I, q. 18 (its dating still oscillates between the beginning and
the end of the 1280s),51 when faced with the question An papa habeat
universalissimam potestatem, Olivi does not hesitate to put limits on papal
power, not because the pope cannot abolish the rights of the clergy,
but rather because the pope cannot give a dispensation from reli-
gious vows, according to Olivi. Of course this aims at defending the
Franciscan vow of poverty. In general, however, Olivi thinks that
the pope should respect the statuta patrum, the Church tradition, and
aim at the common good of the Church; otherwise he exceeds the
limits of his oﬃce. Moreover, Olivi adds that the pope cannot be
considered, as someone claims, “Lord of all temporal goods of this
world.” According to the Franciscan master, there are many reasons
to reject this claim. First, if the pope derived such a lordship over
the world from Christ, this would mean that Christ could not have
given Peter the counsel of highest poverty, as he actually did. Second,
this would contradict the practice of donating goods to individual
dioceses on some condition, since bishops would in reality already
be lords of everything existing within their jurisdiction.52 Following
49 C. Zuckerman, “Some Texts of Bernard of Auvergne on Papal Power,” RTAM
49 (1982), pp. 174–204, esp. pp. 190–4.
50 Cf. R. Lambertini, “La difesa dell’ordine francescano di fronte alle critiche dei
Secolari in Olivi,” in Pierre de Jean Olivi (1248–1298). Pensée scolastique, dissidence spir-
ituelle et société, A. Boureau and S. Piron, eds. (Paris 1999), pp. 193–205.
51 See M. Bartoli, “Introduzione,” in Petri Iohannis Olivi Quaestiones de romano
pontiﬁce, ed. M. Bartoli (Grottaferrata [Rome] 2002), pp. 94–6. Piron opts for the
end of the decade in his chapter above.
52 Peter John Olivi, Quodl. I, q. 18, An papa habeat universalissimam potestatem, in
Petri Iohannis Olivi Quaestiones de romano pontiﬁce, ed. M. Bartoli (Grottaferrata [Rome]
2002), pp. 171–9, esp. p. 175: “Si enim papa ex absoluto iure evangelico et abso-
luta Christi commissione esset temporalis rex et dominus mundi, tunc Petro apos-
tolorum principi non commisisset statum et consilium altissime paupertatis, sed potius
summarum divitiarum et terrene temporalitatis”; p. 176: “Cuius contrarium non
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this pattern, Olivi is also able to counter an argument referring to
the Donation of Constantine: the very fact that the Emperor Cons-
tantine donated something to the pope implies that the pontiﬀ was
not, from the beginning, as Christ’s vicar, lord of the universe. The
Franciscan friar remarks that the actual extension and time of the
Donation of Constantine need not be discussed in this context. It is
suﬃcient to ascertain that the pope acquired, at a certain point of
time, temporal powers that he had not possessed before.53
Naturally, the principle of resistance to an unjust ruler whose
actions menace the good of the community could be applied, and
often with less caution, to secular powers as well.54 In fact, in the
same years some quodlibetal responses defended the principle that
it is legitimate to resist a secular ruler who jeopardizes the common
good. Godfrey of Fontaines, for example, supports this opinion in
Utrum princeps dicens se habere causam pro utilitate reipublicae nec tamen huius-
modi necessitas est de se notoria possit imponere aliquam taxationem et subiecti
teneantur solvere (Quodlibet XI, q. 17, 1295/96), and grants the subjects
the right to resist, until a council of prudent men (and not only the
king’s personal counsellors) has discussed the matter.55
Resistance against Ad fructus uberes was notoriously crushed in 1290
by Cardinal Benedict Gaetani (the future Boniface VIII), acting as
papal legate in Paris. It is interesting to note, as one reads in a
recently published contemporary account of the events, that in quodli-
betal disputations the masters refused to answer questions linked to
the controversy.56 As is well known, Henry of Ghent himself was
solum ostendit contraria consuetudo, immo et Hugo, libro II De sacramentis, parte
II, ca. VII, dicit de terrenis bonis; quedam ecclesie Christi devotione ﬁdelium con-
cessa sunt ad possidendum; salvo tamen iure terrene potestatis.”
53 Peter John Olivi, Quodl. I, q. 18, ed. cit., pp. 178–9: “. . . dicendum quod quan-
tumcumque terrenam potestatem Constantinus pape dederit ex ipsamet donatione
constat quod potestas illa non sibi prius inerat ex sola Christi commissione seu ex
sola potestate spirituali. Quod autem et quantum dederit non est nobis nunc cure,
quia potestas temporalis sicut temporaliter est acquisibilis sic et amissibilis et hoc
multiplicibus modis.” For late medieval discussions about the Donation of Constantine
see recently M. Conetti, L’origine del potere legittimo. Spunti polemici contro la donazione di
Costantino da Graziano a Lorenzo Valla (Parma 2004).
54 Kempshall, The Common Good, p. 250.
55 Cf. above, n. 27.
56 H. Anzulewicz, “Zur Kontroverse um das Mendikantenprivileg. Ein ältester
Bericht über das Pariser Nationalkonzil von 1290,” AHDLMA 60 (1993), pp. 283–91,
p. 291: “Disputatione de quolibet facta quaestiones fuerunt iterum motae, quas min-
ime receperunt.” Hödl, “Theologiegeschichtliche Einführung,” p. LXXXIII, recalls
a similar situation when the mendicant masters refused to answer.
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prohibited from teaching, although it is not known to what extent
this prohibition was put into eﬀect.
The second quodlibetal front in the controversy between secular
and mendicant theologians was the issue of the concept of perfec-
tion. The mendicant orders, and in particular the Franciscans, claimed
not only to lead a life of religious perfection, but also to represent
the highest degree of perfection because of their choice of absolute
poverty. Nicholas III, with his bull Exiit qui seminat (1279), substan-
tially endorsed the Franciscan position, stating that the Franciscans
imitated the life of the apostolic community. He also tried to put
an end to discussion, prohibiting commentaries on his decree. A
manuscript of Godfrey of Fontaines’ Quodlibeta reports that for this
reason the bull was nicknamed “Noli me tangere” in the milieu of
the Parisian masters.57 Actually, masters were still confronted with
questions regarding the meaning of religious perfection; in particu-
lar they were asked to compare the perfection of friars and prelates.
Already in his Quodlibet II, q. 1458 (1277, that is, before Exiit qui sem-
inat), Henry had defended the perfection of the prelates, stating that
one should distinguish between two types of perfection, acquisitive
perfection and exercitative perfection, as Matthew Kempshall ren-
ders the distinction.59 His answer therefore tried to show that higher
and lower prelates (obviously seen as a status, not as individuals)
exert perfection, while friars make their religious choice in order to
acquire perfection. How such a distinction could be used to counter
Franciscan claims can be seen in his Quodlibet V, q. 30 (1280–81),
where Henry answers the question Utrum liceat dimittere divitias sub
proposito mendicandi in saeculo. Arguing that it is licit for a persona pri-
vata, but not for a persona publica, such as a church prelate, Henry
implies that absolute poverty and mendicancy have more value for
the individual than for the religious community, and therefore for
the common good.60
Godfrey of Fontaines follows in Henry’s footsteps, especially in
Quodlibet V, q. 1 (1288), Utrum status religiosorum sit perfectior quam sta-
tus praelatorum et specialiter sacerdotum parochialium, and in Quodlibet VIII,
57 Cf. the outstanding analysis in A. Tabarroni, Paupertas Christi et apostolorum.
L’ideale francescano in discussione (1322–1324) (Roma 1990). For Godfrey of Fontaines’
anecdote, cf. his Quodlibet XIII, q. 8, ed. J. Hoﬀmans (Louvain 1935), p. 249, n. 16.
58 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. II, q. 14, ed. R. Wielockx (Leuven 1983), pp. 82–95.
59 Kempshall, The Common Good, pp. 181–2.
60 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. V, q. 30 (ed. Paris 1518), ﬀ. 208v–209r.
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q. 11 (1292/93), Utrum perfectio vitae humanae exigat relinquere bona exte-
riora et quantum ad actum sive possessionem et quantum ad aﬀectum sive
amorem.61 Moreover, he criticises the Franciscan interpretation of per-
fection and develops, on the contrary, the idea of a natural right to
own the necessities of life, interpreting it as a right that cannot be
renounced.62 This is particularly clear in Quodlibet XI, q. 8 (1295/96),63
Utrum pura privatio possit aliquem constituere in statu perfectionis,64 and in
Quodlibet XII, qq. 19–20 (1296/97), Utrum status religiosorum nihil haben-
tium in communi sit perfectior statu aliquid habentium and Utrum nunc in
Ecclesia est aliquis status perfectior statu apostolorum,65 which not by chance
were in turn attacked by the anonymous Franciscan author of De
perfectione66 and by William of Alnwick.67 As Virpi Mäkinen has rightly
pointed out, quodlibetal discussions on poverty as religious perfec-
tion became one area where authors such as Godfrey could lay the
foundations of a language of basic rights pertaining by nature to
each individual. Such rights are linked so tightly to the human con-
dition that it is neither possible nor licit to alienate them. Arguing
61 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. V, q. 16, ed. cit., p. 76: “Status autem religionis
dicitur perfectionis acquirendae, quia bene sustinet imperfectum qui in illo perfec-
tionem possit acquirere; et non dicitur status perfectionis exercendae, tum quia, ut
dictum est, perfectum non requirit, tum quia sua perfectio, cum ab aliquo acquisita
fuerit, non sic eius exercitium ad perﬁciendum alium ordinatur, sicut perfectio prae-
lati.” Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. VIII, q. 11, ed. cit., pp. 102–25, esp. p. 105:
“Immo etiam propter hoc quod unusquisque tenetur iure naturae vitam suam sus-
tentare, quod non contingit nisi de bonis exterioribus, ideo etiam iure naturae quili-
bet habet dominium et quoddam ius in bonis communibus exterioribus huius mundi,
cui iuri etiam non potest renuntiare licite . . . In tali casu ergo habens usum alicuius
sibi necessarii, habet etiam dominium illius et aequaliter unus sicut alius, quia quili-
bet habet ius utendi illo ut re sua.”
62 V. Mäkinen, “Godfrey of Fontaines’ Criticism Concerning Franciscan Poverty
and the Birth of Individual Rights,” Picenum Seraphicum 19 (2000) pp. 69–85; eadem,
Property Rights in the Late Medieval Discussion on Franciscan Poverty (Leuven 2001), esp.
pp. 124–39.
63 According to Kempshall, The Common Good, p. 247, most probably after March
1296.
64 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. XI, q. 8, ed. J. Hoﬀmans (Louvain 1932), pp. 40–8.
65 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. XII, qq. 19–20, ed. J. Hoﬀmans (Louvain 1932),
pp. 139–65.
66 The textual tradition of this work does not allow us to establish whether it
was originally a quodlibetal question; I am inclined to think that it was rather a
quaestio disputata; see R. Lambertini, La Povertà pensata (Modena 2000), pp. 163–86.
67 Alnwick’s reaction was included in one of his Bolognese disputed questions;
see R. Lambertini, “Intentions in Fourteenth Century Bologna: Jandun, Alnwick
and the Mysterious ‘G’,” in Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition, Acts of the
Symposium ‘The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy’, January 10–13, 1996, S. Ebbesen
and R.L. Friedman, eds. (Copenhagen 1999), pp. 431–51, p. 435, n. 10.
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against the theoretical foundations of the Franciscan claim to absolute
perfection, Godfrey therefore made a substantial contribution to the
rise of subjective, natural rights.68
From the point of view of political theory, the most important
issue at stake in the discussion about the right to hear confessions
is the origin of the jurisdictional powers of the bishops and parish
priests. In his Quodlibet, q. 80 (disputed before 1291), Utrum auctoritas
ligandi et solvendi derivetur in inferioribus praelatis a papa ita quod non habeant
auctoritatem quam non habeant a papa, the canon regular Servais of Mont-
Saint-Eloi claims that some of the prelates’ rights derive directly from
Christ, to the eﬀect that even the pope cannot encroach on them.69
The secular master Peter of Auvergne’s Quodlibet I, q. 17 (ca. 1296),
Utrum praelati minores habeant iurisdictionem ordinariam in subditis, defends
the rights of the parish clergy, countering the arguments put for-
ward by those who wanted to avoid certain consequences that seemed
to imply some disadvantage for their state, most probably the men-
dicant friars.70 Some years later (in 1304, since he refers to Inter 
cunctas—February 1304—and speaks of Benedict XI as alive), a sim-
ilar problem surfaces in Thomas of Bailly’s answer to the question
Utrum expediat uniuersali ecclesie quod subditi ita eximantur a suis parochial-
ibus curatis quod non teneantur eis conﬁteri illa peccata que sunt confessis fratribus
priuilegiatis, shortly after Benedict XI’s Inter cunctas had revoked the
regulations issued by his predecessor Boniface VIII in Super cathedram.
The secular master appeals to Bonaventure’s authority or to Francis
of Assisi’s Testament, in order to remind the friars (in all probability
especially the Franciscans) of their duty to respect bishops and the
secular clergy in general.71 Moreover, he stresses that the powers
exercised by parish priests were given to them directly by Christ,
68 Mäkinen, Property Rights, pp. 193–6. For the whole issue of natural rights in
medieval political thought see also B. Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights (Atlanta
1997); according to Tierney, Henry’s discussion concerning the right to ﬂee of a
man sentenced to death also reveals a “natural rights” approach to such problems:
B. Tierney, “Natural Rights in the Thirteenth Century: a Quaestio of Henry of
Ghent,” Speculum 67 (1992), pp. 58–68.
69 Servais of Mont-Saint-Eloi’s Quodlibet, q. 80, is published in B. Guyot, “Textes
inédites relatifs a l’étude précédente,” AHDLMA 36 (1961), pp. 159–61, see esp. 
p. 160: “Similiter dico quod plenarius Christi vicarius non habet potestatem aufe-
rendi ministris ecclesiae potestatem quam eis contulit.”
70 Peter of Auvergne’s Quodlibet I, q. 17, is published in Guyot, “Textes inédites,”
pp. 153–8.
71 Thomas of Bailly, Quodl. IV, q. 14, ed. Glorieux cit., pp. 324–35.
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when He sent out the 72 disciples, in the same way that He con-
ferred episcopal powers on the apostles. The supreme authority of
the pope has been ordained for the preservation of Church unity,
but he is not the source, in its proper sense, of their powers. It is
legitimate for him to modify the extension of some jurisdictional
powers, if this beﬁts the good of the Church, but he cannot abolish
them. Faced with the fact that with Inter cunctas Pope Benedict XI
seems to exempt the subjects from the jurisdiction of their secular
prelates completely in favour of privileged mendicant friars, Thomas
admits that the pope can do it de facto because he has no superior.
He refuses, however, to give his solution to the question whether de
iure the pope is allowed to do it.72 Apparently, the masters were able
not only to refuse answering a question at all, but also, while respond-
ing, to avoid expressing their opinion on side-issues that were con-
sidered dangerous for their own careers and positions.
Other quodlibetal questions debated by non-mendicant masters in
the following years stress the point that Christ invested the twelve
apostles, and not only Peter, with episcopal powers: an example is
provided by the canon regular Gerard of Saint-Victor.73 Also, the
heated controversy between the secular theologian John of Pouilly
and the mendicant friars, and in particular Peter de la Palu, began
in quodlibetal disputations. In his Quodlibet V, q. 14 (Si habens privi-
legium quod possit predicare in tota una provincia vel ubique sit in parrochia
unius curati et velit ibi predicare et similiter curatus et sit contentio inter eos de
predicando prius et posterius, utrum habens privilegium debeat preferri prelato et
predicare ante illum), John defended with force the opinion that Christ
had instituted parish priests directly through the mission of the 72
72 Thomas of Bailly, Quodl. IV, q. 14, ed. Glorieux cit., p. 329: “Sed utrum domi-
nus papa pro libito suae voluntatis possit praelatos maiores et minores universaliter
excludere ab oﬃciis curae suae? Constat quod potest potentia facti, pro quanto non
potest ad superiorem appellari. Sed utrum de potentia iuris possit, nihil determino.”
73 Gerard of Saint-Victor, Quodl. II, q. 8, Utrum potestas ordinaria sit a Christo vel a
papa, BAV, Vat. lat. 1086, f. 224va: “Dicendum quod potestas est duplex, scilicet
ordinis et iurisdictionis; tunc dico quod illud quod homo consequitur per istas est
a Christo. Credo tamen quod sit una potestas habens diuersa oﬃcia, habendo tan-
tum ordinem sacerdotalem potest exire in actum, set quantum ad iurisdictionem
requiritur aliud. Dicendum tamen quod utraque potestas est a Christo quia fuit
data Petro et aliis, ut patet super illud ‘Tu es Petrus’ per glosam expressam, licet
videatur dari uni quia per hoc notabat unitatem ecclesie . . . Sed quantum ad limi-
tationem, restringendo habet papa et hoc expediens fuit propter bonum commune
et in casu rationabili.”
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disciples.74 In q. 4, Utrum episcopus possit committere audientiam confes-
sionum sine licentia curatorum, of his only Quodlibet (1314), Peter attacks
John of Pouilly both on the origin of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and
on his interpretation of the duty to confess to parish priests.75 It
would be superﬂuous to summarise here the events that eventually
led to the condemnation of John of Pouilly by John XXII with Vas
electionis—a condemnation that concerned only John of Pouilly’s doc-
trine concerning confession and his denial that the pope can inter-
fere with the secular clergy’s right to hear confessions.76 Interestingly
enough, at a time when the ﬁrst treatises de potestate papae had already
appeared, the debate over John of Pouilly’s theses, which had begun
in quodlibetal questions, was continued in almost systematic treat-
ments of papal powers. The treatise De causa immediata ecclesiastice potes-
tatis, attributed to William of Peter Godin but also to Peter de la
Palu, deals extensively with the problem of ecclesiastical juridiction
and defends the idea that every jurisdiction derives directly from the
pope.77 John of Pouilly’s ideas are also the target of another treatise
de potestate pape, penned by the Dominican master Hervaeus Natalis.78
Papal Abdication and Its Consequences
We should not be surprised that a political debate could ﬁnd its ﬁrst
expression in quodlibeta and then continue in political treatises. This
had already happened some years before the “Pouilly aﬀair,” almost
74 John of Pouilly, BAV, Vat. lat. 1017, ﬀ. 223rb–227rb.
75 Miethke, De potestate papae, p. 140; R. Zeyen, Die theologische Disputation des Johannes
de Polliaco zur kirchlichen Verfassung (Frankfurt am Main 1976); J. Dunbabin, A Hound
of God. Pierre de la Palu and the Fourteenth-Century Church (Oxford 1991), pp. 56–68.
76 J. Koch, “Der Prozess gegen den Magister Johannes de Polliaco und seine
Vorgeschichte (1312–1321),” RTAM 5 (1933), pp. 391–422, now in idem, Kleine
Schriften II (Rome 1973), pp. 387–422.
77 Miethke, De potestate papae, pp. 146–150; edition (with attempt to attribute the
treatise to William of Peter Godin) in W.D. McCready, The Theory of Papal Monarchy
in the Fourteenth Century (Toronto 1982); Dunbabin, Hound of God, pp. 91–4. L. Hödl,
“Die Glosse des Johannes Monachus zur Konstitution ‘Super cathedram’ Bonifaz’
VIII (vom 18.02.1300) und deren Kritik durch Petrus de Palude OP,” Zeitschrift der
Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte: Kanonistische Abteilung 87 (2001), pp. 269–305, attempts
to attribute to Peter a new text concerning the origins of power in the Church.
78 Miethke, De potestate papae, p. 149; Hervaeus’ De potestate ecclesiastica et papali was
printed several times; the Paris 1647 edition was reprinted in 1966.
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immediately after Celestine V’s resignation. As is very well known,
Celestine’s unprecedented and dramatic decision became politically
very relevant when Boniface VIII’s adversaries (ﬁrst and foremost
the Colonna cardinals) began to question the legitimacy of his author-
ity precisely on the grounds that papal resignation is impossible.79
The ﬁrst reactions of Parisian university masters are embedded in
quodlibetal questions;80 in his Quodlibet XII, q. 17, answering the
more general question Utrum praelati statui et dignitati libere renuntiare
possint, Godfrey of Fontaines denies that the circumstance of having
no superior can aﬀect the principle that a prelate who thinks him-
self unﬁt for his oﬃce is free to resign. Moreover, Godfrey takes for
granted that the pope can be deposed by a council. But resignation,
unlike deposition, is a voluntary act, and for this reason, according
to the Flemish master, the pope does not need the consent of a
council to resign; it is suﬃcient for him to explain his action to the
college of cardinals. However, the pope can resign against the will
of the cardinals as well. Godfrey’s answer legitimates Celestine’s abdi-
cation and, consequently, Boniface VIII’s election. In doing so,
Godfrey treats the pope as the supreme prelate of the Church, who
is, nevertheless, subject to the same rules as other prelates: when the
good of the community is at stake, resignation and even deposition
are possible.81 Along similar lines, around 1296, Peter of Auvergne
answered a question (Quodlibet I, q. 15) that, unlike in Godfrey’s case,
79 J.R. Eastman, Papal Abdication in Later Mediaeval Thought (Lewinston-Queenston-
Lampeter 1990); cf. also Miethke, De potestate papae, pp. 63–71.
80 The literary form (the incipit reads “Circa statum pape duo queruntur”) of
the anonymous questions about papal abdication preserved in Paris, BNF, lat. 4246,
and studied by Martin Bertram could give rise to the suspicion that they derive
from a quodlibetal disputation, but this is far from clear; M. Bertram, “Zwei
Handschriftliche Quaestionen; Die Abdankung Papst Cölestin V. (1294) und die
Kanonisten,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte: Kanonistische Abteilung 66
(1970), pp. 1–101; pp. 97–8. Eastman does not seem to have taken these texts into
consideration.
81 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. XII, q. 17, ed. Hoﬀmans, pp. 96–9, esp. p. 98,
where both possibilities are envisaged: “sed ad hoc intelligendum quod multo maiori
diﬃcultate et diligentia et attentione est procedendum in causa depositionis quam
in causa cessionis quia in depositione contingit quod ab aliis accusatus, eo invito
deponitur, et quia aliquis nolens iniuriam patitur, causa depositionis in qua potest
alicui inferri gravis iniuria diligentissime est examinanda ne deposito iniuria infer-
atur. Sed quia cessio est simpliciter voluntaria, ideo non sic a concedentibus licen-
tiam cedendi vel consensum cedendi potest iniuria inferri quia nullus patitur iniustum
volens”; cf. commentary in Eastman, Papal Abdication, pp. 54–5; Kempshall, The
Common Good, pp. 258–60.
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addressed the problem of papal resignation directly: Utrum summus
pontifex possit cedere vel renunciare oﬃcio suo in aliquo casu.82 Peter’s response
is aﬃrmative; he also stresses—as Eastman has rightly pointed out—
that a pope who is unable to fulﬁl his duties should abdicate. Unlike
Godfrey, Peter explicitly mentions Celestine’s abdication and, more
importantly, avoids making reference to papal deposition.83 This
diﬀerence between the two masters would become very important
in the treatises that continued the debate over papal abdication. Giles
of Rome’s treatise De renuntiatione papae clearly distinguishes between
deposition and resignation, allowing only for abdication, while John
of Paris, who was conversant with both Godfrey’s and Giles’ texts,
argues in favour of the possibility of both resignation and deposi-
tion.84 Papal resignation would still play an important role in later
de potestate papae treatises, written several years after Boniface VIII’s
death, such as in Alexander of Sant’Elpidio’s De ecclesiastica potestate.85
Apparently, the debate over Celestine’s abdication made an impor-
tant contribution to the deﬁnition of the papal oﬃce, so that later
works had to refer to arguments and positions that were ﬁrst put
forth in quodlibetal disputations.
The interplay between quodlibetal literature and de potestate papae
treatises can be seen in Augustine of Ancona, the Augustinian Hermit
who is very well known for his Summa de ecclesiastica potestate. Besides
82 Edition and commentary in Eastman, Papal Abdication, pp. 58–60, 137–41.
83 Eastman, Papal Abdication, p. 140: “ubi summus pontifex non posset gerere
curam ecclesie propter aliquid predictorum contradictum (? Eastman’s reading does
not seem to make sense here), quod deus precipit ipsum cedere. Racionabile enim
est deum precipere quidquid secundum rationem evidenter necessarium (Eastman:
necessaria) ad salutem et prohibere contrarium. Hoc eciam ordinatum aut suppositum
quod possibile (? Eastman’s reading does not seem to make sense here), est per
dominum Celestinum, quod scilicet summus pontifex cedere possit in casu et ideo
hoc simpliciter est tenendum.” It goes without saying that Eastman’s transcription,
based on MS Paris, BNF, lat. 15841, f. 7va–b needs improvement through a collation
of the whole tradition.
84 Cf. Eastman, Papal Abdication, pp. 70–7.
85 Alexander of Sant’Elpidio, De ecclesiastica potestate, tr. III. c. 8, in Bibliotheca
Maxima Pontiﬁcia II, ed. T. Roccaberti de Perelada (Rome 1698), pp. 1–40, cf. esp.
p. 38: “Cum illa quam papa praeminentiam habet, regere universum populum chris-
tianum, non sit ex statuto concilii, nec etiam universalis ecclesiae totius mundi, ideo
totus mundus illam immutare non posset, nec etiam papam a papatu deponere.”
Miethke, De potestate papae, pp. 105–6; see also my “Alessandro di Sant’Elpidio teorico
del potere papale: un primato ‘romano’,” in Santità e società civile nel medioevo. Esperienze
storiche della santità agostiniana, ed. Biblioteca Egidiana (Tolentino 2005), pp. 69–76.
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this famous and popular treatise, this master intervened in the debates
of his times with shorter texts. Now, scholars of the last century,
such as Scholz and Mulder,86 ascertained that Augustine of Ancona
is the author of a quodlibetal question dealing with the competence
of the college of cardinals during a vacancy of the apostolic see and
also of a short treatise dealing with the same problem. A close com-
parison shows in fact that this quodlibetal question contains many
passages that are almost identical to passages not only in Augustine’s
De potestate collegii mortuo papa, but also in his De potestate praelatorum et
laicorum.87 Glorieux and, most recently, Miethke think that the the-
ologian from Ancona reworked his own quodlibetal determination
into a treatise.88 This explanation remains the most plausible, even
though Mulder, the discoverer of the work in its quodlibetal form,
was rather inclined to believe the opposite. In fact, Augustine’s quodli-
betal question is deﬁned as such in its intitulatio and retains several
expressions reminiscent of an actual disputatio: not only the use of
“arguebatur,” but also the repeated mention of a quaerens who posed
the question.89 The structure of the text itself, however, is rather
peculiar. Asked Utrum collegium cardinalium potest facere quidquid potest
papa, Augustine begins by distinguishing the potestas ordinis from the
potestas iurisdictionis, and then continues by saying that the question
can be taken in two diﬀerent senses. The quaerens could have meant
whether the power of the cardinals derives immediately from Christ,
as is the case for the pope, or mediately through the pope. This
interpretation of the question posed by the audience recalls the debate
between John of Pouilly and Peter de la Palu, and this is not very
surprising, if Glorieux and Miethke are right in dating this text to
the years of the vacancy after Clement V’s death in 1314.90 Augustine
86 The quodlibet is edited in W. Mulder, “De potestate collegii mortuo papa des
Augustinus Triumphus,” Studia catholica 5 (1928/29), pp. 40–60, esp. pp. 46–51. On
Augustine of Ancona, see Miethke, De potestate papae, pp. 170–7.
87 Edited in R. Scholz, Die Publizistik zur Zeit Philipps des Schönen und Bonifaz’ VIII.
(Stuttgart 1903; reprint Amsterdam 1962), respectively pp. 501–8, pp. 486–501.
88 Glorieux II, p. 63; Miethke, De potestate papae, p. 171
89 Mulder, “De potestate,” p. 46: “Questio ultima quolibet (sic!) magistri augus-
tini disputatum parisius de potestate collegii mortuo papa . . . Tercia questio erat . . .
arguebatur”; pp. 48–9: “questio proposita . . . Secundum intentionem querentis.”
90 Glorieux II, p. 63; Miethke, De potestate papae, p. 171. The connection to the
debates over the origin of power in the Church is evident, the title notwithstand-
ing, in Augustine’s Tractatus breuis de duplici potestate prelatorum et laicorum, ed. Scholz
cit., p. 492: “. . . si loquamur de potestate iurisdictionis credimus opinionem dicto-
political QUODLIBETA 465
is persuaded that the quaerens actually meant to ask something diﬀerent,
that is whether, when the pope is dead, the college of cardinals pos-
sesses the same powers as does the supreme pontiﬀ when he is alive.
This persuasion notwithstanding, Augustine goes on to discuss the
ﬁrst interpretation of the question, and comes to the conclusion that
jurisdiction is attributed to the prelates through the pope. This ﬁrst
part of the quodlibet contains many passages in common with Augustine’s
treatise De duplici potestate prelatorum et laicorum, although the latter also
deals with the problem of temporal power, which is absent from the
quodlibet. Only the second part of the quodlibetal question tackles the
issue of the competence of the cardinals when there is no pope. This
is rather close to Augustine’s De potestate collegii mortuo papa. In both
texts, the Augustinian theologian argues that, after the death of the
pope, papal powers continue to exist in the college, but only poten-
tially, to the eﬀect that the college is not entitled to do whatever a
pope can do; otherwise, there would be no need to elect a new
pope. Unlike the quodlibetal question, the treatise expands much
more on this issue, explaining that the college cannot change the
existing papal legislation nor assign beneﬁces.91 The quodlibet is much
shorter, and refers the reader to a tractatus de potestate prelatorum. It
was this clue that suggested to Mulder that Augustine of Ancona
ﬁrst wrote the treatises and later the quodlibet. Actually, in Glorieux
the chronological relationship is reversed, for it seems more likely
that an author would ﬁrst discuss an issue when provoked by his
audience, and then rework his answers in a more systematic text.
But even if Mulder were right, his opinion would not entail the
rather unlikely consequence that Augustine later put together parts
of existing treatises using the quodlibetal question as a literary form
only. He could have held an actual quodlibet and then had recourse
rum magistrorum veritatem non continere, quia talis potestas non est a Christo con-
cessa apostolis, nisi mediante Petro, et per consequens non confertur praelatis eccle-
sie, nisi mediante papa, personam Petri representante.”
91 Augustine of Ancona, De potestate collegii mortuo papa, ed. Scholz cit., p. 506:
“Sed an possit collegium sine papa, quidquid potest cum papa, uel an possit col-
legium mortuo papa, quidquid potest papa uiuens, quod tercio dicebatur esse
declarandum, forte est dubium. Quia tunc non esset necessarium, quod collegium
papam eligeret, ex quo simpliciter posset facere, mortuo papa, quidquid facere potest
papa uiuens uel eo uiuente! Non enim quidquid potest radix cum ramo producto,
potest sine ramo”; p. 507: “Mortuo ergo papa non uidetur, quod collegium possit
tollere decreta et mandata facta per papam, maxime illa que ligant eos, ut dicebat
ratio superior, nec potest beneﬁcia ecclesiastica dispensare . . .”
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to other texts of his own to complete the written version. After all,
in the case of Peter of Tarentaise, Glorieux showed how a direct
reportatio of a quodlibetal discussion could diﬀer from the version
revised by the author.92 At any rate, this case demonstrates not only
how close—at least in the years of Augustine of Ancona’s activity—
quodlibetal questions and political treatises could be, but also that
the relationship between oral performance, reportatio and written ver-
sion deserves further investigation.
Origins of Power, Forms of Government
Previous sections dealt with examples of quodlibetal discussions in
which, more or less directly, issues emerged that are relevant for the
history of medieval political thought. Here I would like to present
some cases in which “classical” problems of political theory are
directly and explicitly dealt with in quodlibetal questions. For exam-
ple, at a date which is still under scrutiny,93 Henry of Friemar was
asked to determine Utrum magis expediat rei publice habere regem per elec-
tionem quam per successionem, a question that was more common in
commentaries on the Politics94 than in quodlibeta. Henry is persuaded
that Aristotle prefers elective to hereditary monarchy and, although
he is well aware that Giles of Rome (referred to as reverendi doctores)
taught the opposite in his De regimine, he is ready to contradict the
oﬃcial “doctor” of his order on this point. Giles claimed that expe-
rience shows that hereditary monarchy avoids many evils that are
typical of elective monarchy. Henry counters that Giles’ arguments
92 P. Glorieux, “Le quodlibet de Pierre de Tarantasia,” RTAM 9 (1937), pp.
237–80.
93 In volume II of this book, Schabel and Courtenay rightly point to the patent
contradiction existing between Stroick’s references to Henry’s sources and the date
(1306) contained in the colophon.
94 List of questions in Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation II, pp. 109, 117, 130,
151; Raymond Rigaud also discusses the problem in his Quodlibet V, q. 30 (before
1295): Utrum regnum sit melius per successionem vel per electionem; cf. F.M. Delorme,
“Quodlibets et questions disputées de Raymond Rigaud, maître franciscain de Paris,
d’après le ms. 98 de la Bibl. Comun. de Todi,” in Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters.
Studien und Texte Martin Grabmann zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres von Freunden und
Schülern gewidmet, A. Lang, J. Lehner, and M. Schmaus, eds. (Münster in Westfalen
1935), pp. 826–84; cf. also Glorieux II, p. 246.
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concern accidental features of political life; “per se” the Philosopher
is right: election is better than fortuity.95
Most probably around 1310, John of Mont-Saint-Eloi also answered
a question (Quodlibet II, q. 9) that addressed a core issue of political
theory directly: Utrum potestas principum sit primitus a populo. His answer
is interesting from many points of view. First of all, he shows aware-
ness of the debate concerning the unity of prudence and claims that
it is the same virtue in subjects and in rulers.96 Second, he distin-
guishes three ways in which a ruler can obtain authority: through
force or knowledge, from God, or from people. The ﬁrst way is
rejected as an expression of pride and conceit. Moses and Saul are
recalled as examples where power was given directly by God.97 John
of Mont-Saint-Eloi, however, is more interested in describing why
and how a ruler can derive his authority from the people. Peace in
a multitude can be safeguarded only by a prince, says John, and
therefore the community inclines by nature towards a ruler. Since
everyone is by species equal to anyone else in the community, it is
necessary that the prince be designated by the consent of the people
95 Edition in C. Stroick, Heinrich von Friemar. Leben, Werk, philosophisch-theologische
Stellung in der Scholastik (Freiburg 1954), pp. 245–6; esp. p. 246: “Quamvis ergo in
tali materia diﬃcile vel potius impossibile est rationes necessarias adducere, sed
suﬃciat in ea probabiliter persuadere, secundum praemissas tamen videtur institu-
tio principis per electionem magis expediens eo quod magis expedit regi rem pub-
licam arte quam sorte et a proponente quam a fortuna ac per hoc subiecti magis
ad virtutum opera inducuntur et maiorem inter se amicitiam et reverentiam com-
plectuntur; et ad hos potissime moveor ex eo quod res publica nunquam ita bene
gubernata fuit sicut tempore illo quo per viros virtuosos et propter eminentiam vir-
tutum electos Romanum Imperium regebatur.” Unfortunately, I had no access to
John of Naples’ Quodlibet I, q. 20, which bears the same title as the one discussed
by Henry of Friemar.
96 John of Mont-Saint-Eloi, Quodl. II, q. 9, Utrum potestas principum sit primitus a
populo, BAV, Vat. lat. 1086, ﬀ. 220ra–va; here 220ra: “Ideo cum quis eligitur in
regem, non acquirit aliam prudentiam quam prius habuit. Item sicut magister, cum
instituitur, illa facultas non est aliud quam sua scientia in ordine ad discipulos
quos//220rb//docere debet, ita hic . . .”
97 John of Mont-Saint-Eloi, Quodl. II, q. 9, ibid.: “Sed queris: A quo <oritur>?
Dicendum quod causa principalis est deus. Romanos: ‘non est potestas nisi a deo’;
qui uero habent in potestate superbiam, hoc non est a deo. Si vero queris a quo
derivatur sicut a causa proxima oritur ista potestas, dicendum quod sicut pruden-
tia acquiritur uel a deo, uel ab industria hominis . . . Sed unde iste dominatur?
Dicendum quod potest esse diuersis causis. Nam quidam sua potentia uel sapien-
tia inducunt ad hoc populum ut patet de Nemroth, Gen. Item aliquando est a
domino, ut instituit Moysem, Saulem. Item potest esse a populo considerans bonum
commune. Primi habent motum presumpcionis et superbie . . .”
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or of its better part.98 The case of hereditary monarchy does not
constitute a valid counterexample, because the people can decide to
be ruled through the hereditary principle, so that the prince cannot
be deposed unless he damages the community. John also interprets
the controversial episode of Pope Zacharias’ deposition of the last
Merovingian king from this perspective. Adhering to an opinion that
was rejected by the Papal Curia at the time, this Paris theologian
claims that Childeric was deposed by the multitude of his subjects,
and Zacharias simply limited himself to approving the deposition.99
Resorting to a expression that is clearly reminiscent of an actual dis-
cussion, John also dismisses an objection coming “a latere.” According
to this objection the king enjoys a direct dominium over all the goods
existing in his kingdom, which is not true for the people. John coun-
ters that the people never granted the king any such right; the author-
ity he has over the goods of his subjects can be used only for the
sake of the community and cannot be compared to the right he pos-
sess over a good he himself has acquired.100
The canon regular John of Mont-Saint-Eloi was confronted with
a question directly concerning the origins and extent of lay power.
A few years later, even though the chronology of his quodlibeta is far
from being determined (the ﬁrst Quodlibet should be dated to 1315/16,
98 John of Mont-Saint-Eloi, Quodl. II, q. 9, ibid.: “Si ergo aliquis iuste princi-
patur in populo oportet quod sit uel a deo uel a populo; nam multitudo non potest
teneri in pace nisi saluetur iusticia, et quia ad hoc multitudo naturaliter inclinatur,
ideo etc. et ad dominium naturaliter inclinatur et ad principem. Unde arguo: con-
sonum est recte rationi quod multitudo illud eligat quod vel ad quod naturaliter
inclinatur. Item per naturam quilibet est equalis alteri in specie, ergo numquam
aliquis instituitur a natura, si ergo recte principetur, hoc est per consensum multi-
tudinis uel sanioris partis. Item, quilibet habet auctoritatem saluandi personam suam,
ergo multitudo habet a deo auctoritatem saluandi se ipsam, quod ﬁt per principem . . .
Item nulla necessitas fuit principatus nisi populus; nam populus fuit prius, ideo prin-
cipatum instituit et non econuerso.”
99 John of Mont-Saint-Eloi, Quodl. II, q. 9, ibid.: “Ad illud de successione natu-
rali dicendum quod ista non contradicunt, quia possit (?) esse quod populus sic insti-
tuit ut per successionem esset princeps, nec potest amoveri a multitudine nisi
principetur in destructionem multitudinis . . . Unde Zacharias deposuit regem Franciae,
quia principes hoc sibi proposuerunt et ipse consensit, non deposuit, 15. q. 6. c.
aliis; multitudo enim eum deposuit eo approbante.”
100 John of Mont-Saint-Eloi, Quodl. II, q. 9, f. 202va: “Item arguebatur a latere,
quia princeps habet dominium <di>rectum, populus autem non. Dicendum quod
numquam multitudo talem auctoritatem dedit sibi, sed solum ut venit ad bonum
multitudinis, non in destructionem, unde non habet dominium directum sicut super
domum uel agrum quem emit.”
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but on the basis of speculation, and not direct evidence), the Dominican
master John of Naples was asked an even more fundamental ques-
tion, why there are power relations among human beings. The fact
that this question was posed directly is interesting in itself, because,
as we have already seen, in earlier texts the problem of the origins
of power was tackled in an indirect way, very often via the problem
of the origins of private property. Perhaps this is not by mere chance:
in a period when treatises de potestate papae were widespread, the audi-
ences at quodlibetal disputations were more accustomed to phrasing
their questions in terms of principles. On the other hand, one should
not forget that John of Naples is the author of a quaestio (not belong-
ing to a quodlibet) about papal power that with good reason Miethke
lists among the de potestate papae treatises.101 As Pierre Michaud-Quantin
showed more than forty years ago,102 in Quodlibet II, q. 18, John of
Naples discussed the question Utrum in primo statu fuerit dominium unius
hominis super alium.103 Asking whether in the State of Innocence there
existed a dominion of a man over other men entails asking about
the role of power in God’s project for mankind. John of Naples
answers that before the Fall no man could be the slave or servant
(in this context, “servus” has a wide semantic scope) of another, but
political authority did exist. One should distinguish between two
kinds of dominium: the ﬁrst is exercised over individuals who are not
free, and can be called “despotical,” applying Aristotle’s word in the
Politics. The second kind of dominium can be dubbed “political” and
is exercised over free persons. John argues at length that in the State
of Innocence nothing made the despotical dominium necessary.
Interestingly enough, he argues ﬁrst of all that men in the State of
Innocence cannot experience anything that contradicts their will; as
a consequence they cannot be deprived of their freedom against their
will. Second, he remarks that servitus can be a constriction, an eﬀect
of natural diﬀerences, or a free choice. John dismisses these three
possibilities, not only because human beings before Sin are not forced
to do anything, but also because among individuals in the State of
101 Miethke, De potestate papae, p. 316.
102 P. Michaud-Quantin, “Le droit naturel chez Jean de Naples,” RTAM 29
(1962), pp. 268–287.
103 John of Naples, Quodl. II, q. 18, Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale, VII.B.28, ﬀ.
38va–39ra. John had the opportunity to focus on a similar issue also in his Quodlibet
IV, q. 15, Utrum dominium vel servitus competat de iure naturali vel de iure positivo tantum.
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Innocence there are no such diﬀerences justifying the despotical sub-
mission of one to another, as happens after Sin, when, according to
the Philosopher, servitus can be rooted in the intellectual superiority
of one group. Finally, unlike the Fallen State, Innocence does not
imply situations that could lead someone to choose servitus voluntarily.104
One must remember that mankind in the State of Innocence is
mainly devoted to contemplation, an activity that requires freedom.
Nevertheless, even an imaginary, perfect community of humans who
did not experience the Fall needs dominium, one that is exercised,
however, on free persons. This “political” dominium is founded on
diﬀerences in rationality and virtue. In John’s opinion, gender and
slight diﬀerences in bodily constitution and intelligence existed even
in the State of Innocence: according to such diﬀerences some men
would have been able to lead the others, who in their turn would
have freely accepted this kind of subordination.
This principle also holds after the Fall. In this new situation, how-
ever, diﬀerences among human beings become more dramatic, and
even slavery can be considered compatible with natural law, pro-
vided that the slave is by nature suited to execute orders and the
master intelligent enough to lead him. In this way, they complement
each other, because the slave possesses the bodily strength lacking
in his master, but needs to be guided by someone else. Diﬀerent
degrees of intellectual capacity also justify a political hierarchy among
free men, so that social order reﬂects (at least in principle) natural
diﬀerences existing among individuals. Here the Dominican theolo-
gian adopts a line of thought that, as Christoph Flüeler has stressed
in an brilliant article,105 was rooted in the ﬁrst reception of Aristotle’s
politics, especially by the commentator Peter of Auvergne, and exerted
a long-lasting inﬂuence on medieval political thinkers, although it
was not left unchallenged by other traditions.106
104 John of Naples, Quodl. II, q. 18, f. 38vb: “3° fuisset talis servitus quia unus
homo alteri se voluntarie subiecisset ut seruum, et hoc dicere est etiam impossibile,
quia aut homo sic se alteri subiecisset propter aliquam magnam necessitatem, et
hoc dicere est impossibile, quia nulla talis necessitas in illo statu fuisset; aut absque
omni necessitate homo se alteri voluntarie subiecisset, et hoc est impossibile, quia
hoc est contra omnem appetitum et voluntatem et specialiter ordinatam qualiter in
primo statu fuisset.”
105 C. Flüeler, “Ontologie und Politik”; see also idem, Rezeption und Interpretation I.
106 Reference should be made here to one Franciscan tradition, which however
did not ﬁnd as much expression in quodlibeta as in other genres; besides Flüeler,
“Ontologie und Politik,” see also my “Poverty and Power. Franciscan Traditions in
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John of Naples also follows a similar pattern when dealing with
the origins of private property.107 In Quodlibet X, q. 25, Utrum dis-
tinctio dominiorum vel possessionum sit de iure naturali tantum vel de iure pos-
itivo, he argues that in the pre-lapsarian state there was no private
property, but everything was held in common. Only after the Fall
did it become necessary to divide property among individuals and
groups in order to obviate the consequences of sin. Although the
criteria adopted in implementing such a division cannot be said to
depend on nature, but rather on positive laws, after the Fall private
property per se is in perfect accordance with natural reason. Walking
in the footsteps of Aquinas, the Dominican theologian from Naples
reveals a strong tendency towards founding political and economic
institutions in the natural order, while leaving more room for human
initiative only in relation to the actual division of property.
Conclusion
In my opinion, the present survey—its preliminary character notwith-
standing—reveals not only that the ﬁeld of political quodlibeta is far
from having been suﬃciently investigated, but also that it is diﬃcult
to circumscribe them in a clear-cut manner. The most obvious remark
is that, for the period of time I have investigated, ecclesiology was
of greater importance for political theory than it is in modern times.
I have therefore tried to trace a ﬁrst map of “places” that could be
seen as relevant for this issue. This map cannot claim to be deﬁnitive,
if for no other reason than because many questions can reveal an
unsuspected political relevance. One of the most striking examples
is John of Pouilly’s Quodlibet V, q. 15: Utrum si aliquis sit confessus
heresim et postea revocet in facie Ecclesie dicendo se falsum dixisse, talis debeat
dici relapsus, where the author himself declares that this issue has close
connections to the tragic trial of the Knights Templar and that he
has “determined” against them since the time of their arrest by the
Later Medieval Political Thought,” in Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity,
J. Kraye and R. Saarinen, eds. (The New Synthèse Historical Library, 57) (Dordrecht
2005), pp. 141–63. A comparison with Scotus’ thought in this respect could be
interesting; cf. John Duns Scotus’ Economic and Political Philosophy, ed. and trans. A.B.
Wolter (St. Bonaventure, NY, 2001); Lambertini, La povertà pensata, pp. 111–39.
107 For the following I rely essentially on Michaud-Quantin, “Le droit naturel
chez Jean de Naples.”
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oﬃcers of Philip the Fair.108 In this light, the earlier Quodlibet II, 
q. 19, Utrum expediat quod secreta cuiuslibet religionis revelentur papae, also
takes on a strong “political ﬂavour.”109 Some suspicion may then also
arise concerning John of Mont-Saint-Eloi’s Quodlibet II, q. 3, Utrum
confessio extorta per tormenta praejudicet conﬁtenti, although he does not
make any reference to the Templars;110 after all, together with Gerard
of Saint-Victor and Henry of Friemar, he was among the university
masters who signed a sort of oﬃcial answer to a question posed by
King Philip about the Templar aﬀair.111
Sometimes political current events surface unexpectedly in quodli-
betal disputations. A few examples will suﬃce to show this. In 1291/92
Henry of Ghent, discussing Utrum miles, si praevolando consortes suos in
exercitum hostium cadat, faciat opus magnanimitatis (Quodlibet XV, q. 16),
makes reference to the siege of Acre and its fall in 1291,112 com-
108 I am quoting from Zeyen, Die theologische Disputation, p. 25: “Et dicendum quod
anno captionis Templariorum a praelatis diversarum provinciarum congregatis Parisius
multae quaestiones seu multi articuli de Templariis secundum diversa facta et diver-
sas conditiones ipsorum fuerunt traditae doctoribus Sacrae Scripturae et utriusque
iuris, ut de ipsis responderent, quid eis videretur. Inter quas quaestiones proposita
diﬃcilior videbatur et ipsa sola contrarios habuit indices in ambabus facultatibus.
Et multo plures dicebant eos non esse relapsos, et valde pauci dicebant eos iudi-
candos esse relapsos; ita quod fuerunt XIX doctores sacrae Scripturae dicentes eos
non esse relapsos, nullam ad hoc coram praelatis dicti sui rationem assignantes. Ego
autem et duo alii tantum contrarium tenuimus pulchras et bonas rationes, quas
consequenter recitabo, coram dictis praelatis in capella Parisiensis episcopi assignantes.”
109 Glorieux I, p. 225.
110 John of Mont-Saint-Eloi, Quodl. II, q. 3, BAV, Vat. lat. 1086, ﬀ. 217vb–218ra:
“dicendum quod aut perseuerat post tormenta aut non. Si non tunc non preiudicat;
nam pro tempore quo est in tormentis non preiudicat, sed cum est extra tormenta,
tunc sua confessio valet, quia voluntaria est. Si //218ra// uero non perseuerat per
se et directe non preiudicat.”
111 Cf. CUP II, pp. 127–8 (the document is dated 25 March 1308). Karl Ubl has
promised an investigation of Pouilly’s quodlibetal questions concerning the Templars:
cf. Miethke, De potestate, p. 184.
112 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. XV, q. 16 (ed. Paris 1518), ﬀ. 594r–595v; esp. f. 594:
“Quia ista questio tangit et in exemplum proponit captionem, subversionem, atque
destructionem civitatis Acconensis atque Christianorum et incolarum eiusdem: de
quibus mentionem facit dominus papa in littera exhortatoria, de qua mentio habita
est supra in quaestione de indulgentiis, sic inquiens: ‘Ciuitas Acconensis quadra-
ginta quatuor diebus arctissima Babylonicae potentiae obsidione circumdata, terri-
bilibus machinis die noctuque vexata . . . dei permissione mirabili et stupenda succubuit:
capta per eos et igni exposita, christicolis inibi existentibus caesis innumeris, et cae-
teris, qui habere nequiverunt ad maritima vasa succursum, in captivitatem abduc-
tis. Que quidam facta narrantur anno domini Mcc nonagesimo primo, x die mensis
maii.” The pope quoted by Henry is Nicholas IV. The date seems to be wrong,
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menting on the heroism of a Frankish knight. Henry praises the
courage of this person, judges his self-sacriﬁce as an act of virtue
and suggests that if his example had been followed by the others,
resistance in Acre would have been successful.113 As mentioned above,
when Thomas of Bailly comments on Inter cunctas, this papal bull
belonged to the most recent of events. Indeed, Thomas inserts some
positive remarks about Benedict XI’s personality in his treatment,
speaking of the pope as a man of age and experience, even though
at the same time he does not conceal his dissent vis-à-vis the recent
papal decision.114 James of Thérines’ Quodlibet I, q. 13 (1306), declares
already in the title its close connection to current political issues:
Utrum papa debeat remanere Burdegalis vel ire in Italiam.115 This quodlibet
has also been studied as a source for the knowledge the Parisian
masters had of Fra Dolcino’s heresy, since his rebellion against the
Church gave James’ audience the opportunity to question Clement
V’s behaviour. The Cistercian master, rather well informed about
North Italian events, defends the pope’s right to stay in Bordeaux.116
This list of more or less explicit references to current events could
continue, and probably deserves an investigation of its own. This
ﬁrst exploration in the wide ﬁeld of political quodlibeta, however, has
focused on quodlibeta that have relevance for political theory and
could therefore be referred to even outside the immediate context
of their discussion. Through examples taken from mostly edited texts
I have emphasised which issues discussed could have an impact in
but only a critical edition can establish whether Henry was himself not well informed,
or the mistake is a mere copying accident.
113 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. XV, q. 16, ibid., f. 595r: “. . . dico credens ﬁrmiter
quod opus militis nostri erat opus magnanimitatis, ex cuius habitu repente elegit
opus summe arduum, honeste scilicet mori pro ﬁde et civitate, quam fugiendo inho-
neste vivere et forte fuga incerta non subveniente iugum servitutis Sarracenorum
subire. Quod si caeteri cives et commilitones sic fecissent, et tales fuissent ut ille,
credo quod proculdubio in adiutorio dei victoriam obtinuissent, et civitas staret.”
114 Thomas of Bailly, Quodl. IV, q. 14, ed. Glorieux cit., p. 335: “Propter quod
dicendum quod cum dominus Benedictus papa multa viderit, quia antiquus homo
fuit et in multis regionibus conversatus, et sic potuit perpendere aliquos casus propter
quos visum fuit expediens hoc privilegium fratrum concedere, qui casus michi et
multis aliis non apparuerunt, ex quibus videatur michi et multis aliis expediens, sed
potius contrarium. Quid autem in rei veritate expediat, Deus novit.”
115 Cf. Glorieux I, p. 212: edition in idem, Jacques de Thérines. Quodlibet I et II
(Paris 1958), pp. 153–7.
116 R. Orioli, “Jacques de Thérines: una fonte trascurata su Fra Dolcino,” Bullettino
dell’Istituto Storico per il Medio Evo 89 (1980–81), pp. 489–507.
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political thought. From this perspective, political quodlibetal ques-
tions appear not only to have been conduits of political theory, espe-
cially in the decades preceding the rise of de potestate papae treatises,
but also to have paved the way to many of the most famous polit-
ical works of the ﬁrst decades of the fourteenth century. Quodlibetal
questions coexisted for a certain period of time with de potestate papae
treatises, which in the end superseded quodlibeta, but a closer look
reveals a great debt to the preceding discussions, couched in a diﬀerent
context and in a diﬀerent literary genre.
